Thank you, Secretary and Ambassador.

I want to just kind of build on what Senator Risch was talking

about, and then maybe focus more tightly on the nuclear ambitions

of North Korea, which just takes so much of our attention and energy.

It sounds—I’m neither an expert on Korea or on Asia, but it

sounds, from the testimony here today and what I read before

being here today, and following all the things that have been written

about the region leading up to this hearing here today, that

clearly at the core of the nuclear ambitions of this country is survival,

in essence. Most countries develop a nuclear capacity, (a) because,

for example, India and Pakistan are largely focused on each

other, and clearly the cold war is something we fully understand.

From North Korea’s perspective, it doesn’t seem like they’re in fear

of a Japanese invasion or, quite frankly, an American one. This is,

basically—as far as I can see, is an insurance policy. It is the—it

is something that they—their ability to have a nuclear program

makes them, not just a force to be reckoned with in the region, because

of the damage they can do, but, quite frankly, gives them

some level of security and fear that there’s limits on what the

United States or any other actor can do against North Korea’s interests,

because of their capacity to react with a nuclear weapon.

Is that a—I mean, is that basically a accurate description of the purpose——

Of the nuclear program? If I could just touch upon that. They don’t actually

even have to have the weapons, right? They just have to show

the capacity to build them and to deliver it, if they ever wanted to.

What I’m trying to get at is, is that we spend all

this time and energy trying to convince ourselves that we’re going

to be able to ever talk them out of the program. It sounds to me

that, in essence, the program is the regime. It is the core and

essence of its existence and ability to survive. I mean, they’re certainly

not going to stay in power because they’re doing a good job

managing the economy. They’re not going to stay in power because

they do a good job of distributing justice. The one thing that keeps

them in power is the ability to crack down on internal dissent and

the ability to repel foreign intervention in their affairs, because of

this nuclear program. And so, it seems to me like this idea, that

we’re going to somehow be able to pressure and/or convince them

to abandon this program—the price of pressuring them seems like

it’s extraordinarily high, given the central importance that this has

on their regime; I mean, on its very survival. But—and I’m not suggesting that we should—

but, the question, I guess, is there’s two separate topics; one is proliferation.

And clearly, that’s the one that I do believe we could

have some influence over. But, what I’m trying to really kind of arrive

at an answer—is this mix of incentives versus disincentives of

even having a program or having the capacity to have a program.

It’s hard for me to envision what that mix of disincentives that

would lead to them abandoning the program is.

And I guess what I’m really trying to get at—and

I think it’s going to be an ongoing dialogue—is, I’m trying to picture,

in my head, what that would look like. What set of conditions

or disincentives or incentives, what kind of package of those would

it take to tilt the scales for a regime of this nature? And these

are—this is not just a pragmatic—this is not some sort of pragmatic

government that’s looking to build its economy and grow its

country. Above everything else, according to the testimony here

today and everything we’ve seen, what they’re really interested in

is owning this country for as long as they can, and staying in

power, as a family. I’m just trying to figure out what set of incentives/

disincentives it would take to tilt that scale toward abandonment

of this capacity and this program. Obviously, sitting here, it’s

not a—you know, the ideal setting to, kind of, have a——

Conversation about that—but how that’s developed, and, in our mind, whether that’s even realistic.

And I think we have a similar conversation going on with regards

to Iran and other parts of the world. But, this one’s even more

problematic, because we know so little about its decisionmaking

process and things of that nature.

I don’t know if I have time, Chairman, to ask a real quick question,

because I know I’m a little bit——

Just, I wanted to talk briefly about the humanitarian

aid. Again, this is an issue of first impression, to me, having—

this is my second meeting on this committee. I’m interested

in the food program in the past. And how problematic has it been,

in terms of seeing those resources diverted to elites or the military?

Now, we negotiated this monitoring arrangement back in 2007,

I believe—2007/2008. In 2009, the North Koreans threw out our

food assistance team—some people believe, because they became

concerned that having Korean-speaking outsiders—and many of

the United States team were Korean speakers—was not in their

long-term interest, so they threw them out, which is another indication

that perhaps they were quite effective.

But, as we indicated in our respective testimonies, we are currently

assessing need. We have some other things that we need to

do in response to North Korea’s request for renewed food aid. And

then we will talk to the North Koreans about a monitoring system,

which, at its minimum, would be as effective as the one that we had there last time.

Just one more, kind of, question/observation, to

either one of you, and maybe both. You know, I’ve read in a couple

of places some—whether it’s opposition folks outside of North

Korea or what have you—one of the arguments that has been made

is that, clearly, in a country that’s struggling with poverty and a

lot of suffering, you have a government willing to spend between

15 and 25 percent of its gross domestic product on the military,

particularly a very expensive nuclear program, a nuclear ambition.

And the argument is that the—in a country that’s willing to do

that, that this food assistance is basically going to be taken and

used to feed the elites and the military, and that, in essence—I’ve

read somewhere, and I’m not saying I agree with this—but that

food program, in many respects, relieves the pressure on the North

Korean Government to divert funds away from the nuclear program

and divert it toward—and place it to where it should be,

which is feeding and caring for its people. Do you have thought—

and you probably have read some of those statements that have

been made by some—and do you have any thoughts on that, in general?

Is there—— I’m sorry. My last question.

What is the Chinese view—is there an official Chinese view on

unification—officially, unofficially—your impressions on how they

would view that. Particularly since I think we would all agree that

any reunification would look more like South Korea than North

Korea, for obvious reasons. In essence, you think they like it just the way it is.

So, suffice it to say that a unified Korea that

looks like South Korea and has the kind of close relationship with

the United States that South Korea now has is not high on their wish list.